Center for Practical AI
5-guide series

“AI and the environment” is seven arguments wearing one coat.

Some of them are global. Most of them are not. Which one you’re actually asking about determines what the evidence says, who has the answer, and what you can do about it.

Built on federal energy reporting, peer-reviewed water and health research, open hydrological data, state statute, and live utility dockets. Each guide names where the evidence is strong, where it is contested, and where we haven’t done the work.

The seven questions

Seven questions, seven different scales.

Arguments about AI and the environment go wrong when a claim that's true at one scale gets asserted at another. Both of the usual mistakes sound like conviction.

1How much electricity does this take?

The one most people start with, and the best measured.

National totalWell established

LBNL puts US data centers at 4.4% of national electricity in 2023, headed for 6.7–12% by 2028. Federal, and it says nothing about where the load lands.

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2What does that electricity actually emit?

Not the same question as the first one, and the answer isn't in the first number.

GlobalUnresolved

Depends entirely on grid mix and on what the marginal plant is. The marginal-emissions question is unresolved and we say so.

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3How much water, and whose?

Where the famous statistic lives — and where it was retired.

WatershedWell established

Real as a peak and local problem. The per-query figure everyone quotes was withdrawn by the researchers who produced it.

Read the guide
4What does it do to the air people breathe?

The least discussed and among the better substantiated.

AirshedWell established

Substantiated and scenario-dependent, and almost always misreported — the burden is dominated by generation, not by backup diesel.

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5Who pays for the buildout?

Being decided right now, in rooms most people don't know exist.

Utility territoryContested

Actively contested in live rate cases and dockets. Attribution of specific retail increases to data centers is disputed by serious people.

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6Who decided this gets built here?

The most local question, and where most actual decisions get made.

County / parcelWell established

The accountability gap is documented: tax determinations that require nothing in return, and use figures that are contractual trade secrets.

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7What did it take to make the hardware?

Mining, materials, and e-waste — global in flow, local in harm, mostly displaced abroad.

Supply chainWe haven't researched this

CPAI has not done this research, so there is no guide. Building a thin page on material we haven't verified would break the rule this whole section is built on.

Tell us if you need this

A global problem hands you guilt. There is nothing at the end of it you can actually do on a Tuesday. A watershed problem hands you something else entirely: a named municipal water system, a drought plan, a withdrawal permit, and a disclosure requirement that either exists or doesn’t. One of those is a feeling. The other is a phone call.

Getting the scale right is not a way of caring less. It is the only way to do anything.

The tell

Two of these move in opposite directions.

If you need proof these are separate questions rather than one issue with several faces, it's this — and it is the least-quoted finding in the literature.

“Water use by data centres can be negatively coupled with CO2-equivalent emissions, with methods of reducing water consumption increasing carbon emissions in some cases.”

Chien, Gupta, Ren, Sriraman & Tomlinson (2026), Nature Reviews Clean Technology

WatershedGlobal

Closed-loop “zero water” cooling cuts water use and raises electricity demand — which raises emissions. The water question is answered in a basin; the carbon question is answered in the atmosphere. Anyone demanding both zero water and zero carbon is asking for something the engineering does not currently offer. Two impacts that can move in opposite directions were never one issue.

The series

Five guides, one question at a time.

Each guide names the overstated version and the dismissive version of its claim before saying what the evidence supports. That is the whole method.

Question 7 — no guideSupply chain

What did it take to make the hardware?

Mining, materials, and e-waste is a real question and the one most likely to come up in a room. CPAI hasn’t researched it, so there is no guide here. A thin page assembled from unsourced material would break the rule the rest of this section is built on — and it’s the rule we’d be most embarrassed to break here.

Tell us if you need this one →
The method, on the phrase itself

Both of the usual answers are wrong in the same way.

AI is bad for the environment.

The version that goes too far

Treats seven claims of wildly different evidence quality as one settled verdict, and leans on figures their own authors have since retired. The strongest version of this argument is weakened, not helped, by the numbers most often used to make it.

The version that waves it away

Answers a county-level rate increase with a global denominator — “it's only about 3% of world electricity” — which is true, and beside the point for the person holding the bill. A global fraction is not a response to a local cost.

What the evidence supports

Electricity demand is real and well measured. The carbon consequence depends on grid mix and on the marginal plant, which is unresolved. Water and health burden are real, local, and concentrated in specific basins and downwind counties. And the cost and consent questions are being decided right now, in dockets and county meetings most people don't know exist.

Sources for this split: lbnl2024 · healthComputing · smallBottle · ncCommerceMemo — full citations below.

Where this leads

Knowing which question you're asking is a skill.

This series applies it to one contested topic. The Applied AI Certification builds the underlying capability — telling a claim's scale from its rhetoric, and knowing what evidence would change your mind — across every domain where AI shows up, not just this one.

Key research

What this series is built on.

Every empirical claim across the five guides traces to one of these. Each carries three things: where it was published, how the number was produced, and the geographic scale at which its claims hold. A federal report and a preprint are not the same kind of thing, and a modeled estimate is not a measurement.

Federal government reportModeled estimate · not metered measurementNational total
Shehabi et al., Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory / DOE (Dec 2024)2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage ReportUS data centers used 4.4% of national electricity in 2023 — 58 TWh (2014) → 176 TWh (2023) → a projected 325–580 TWh by 2028, or 6.7–12% of US electricity. Cite the range, never the top of it. Published December 2024, so it predates the 2025–26 capital expenditure surge. The report's own limitations section notes it says nothing about where the load lands, which is why its figures are badged national rather than grid.
International agency reportModel projection · scenario-dependentGlobal
International Energy Agency (2025)Energy and AIGlobal data centre electricity demand roughly doubling by 2030 — about 485 TWh to about 950 TWh, near 3% of world electricity. Also the source of the finding that renewables are growing about 22% a year and meeting nearly half of that demand growth, which belongs on the page for the same reason the alarming figures do.Citation still being verified against our research files.
Peer-reviewed studyModeled estimate · not metered measurementWatershed
Li, Yang, Islam & Ren (2023/2025)Making AI Less "Thirsty"Source of the retired 500 ml figure and of its replacement: one GPT-3 output of 150–300 words consumed 16.9 mL total in an average US data center — 2.2 mL onsite cooling plus 14.7 mL at the power plant. Most of the water is not in the building. Ren notes later models are likely more efficient.
Preprint · not yet peer-reviewedModeled estimate · not metered measurementWatershed
Han, Li, Wierman & Ren (2026)Small Bottle, Big PipeUS data centers could require 697–1,451 million gallons per day of new peak water capacity through 2030 — New York City's entire daily supply is about 1,000 MGD — at a build cost of roughly $10B to $58B; or 227–604 MGD if water intensity falls 10% a year. Ren: "Only comparing the annual totals can obscure the real water challenge." The constraint is peak capacity, not annual volume.
Peer-reviewed studyGlobal
Chien, Gupta, Ren, Sriraman & Tomlinson (2026)Strategies and design for increasing AI sustainabilityNature Reviews Clean Technology. Quote in full, never truncated: "Water use by data centres can be negatively coupled with CO2-equivalent emissions, with methods of reducing water consumption increasing carbon emissions in some cases." The dropped second clause is both the mechanism and the paper's own hedge. Closed-loop "zero water" designs raise electricity demand.
Peer-reviewed studyModeled estimate · not metered measurementAirshed
Han, Wu, Li, Wierman & Ren (2026)Health-Informed ComputingCommunications of the ACM. $20.9B in public health costs is the high-growth 2028 scenario; low-growth is $11.7B and the 2023 baseline is $6.67B — always state which. About 1,300 premature deaths and 600,000 asthma symptom cases in the 2028 high scenario. Scope 2 (generation) dominates Scope 1 (onsite backup diesel) by roughly 12 to 1. The worst-affected counties carry about 7× the national average per household.
Open datasetHydrological model · CMIP6 scenariosWatershed
World Resources Institute — Aqueduct 4.0 (2023)Updated Decision-Relevant Global Water Risk IndicatorsThe projected water-stress layer. Hydrological output from PCR-GLOBWB 2 translated into water risk indicators and aggregated to HydroBASINS level 6 sub-basins — which is why the map is basin-shaped rather than county-shaped, and is itself the argument that water is a watershed variable. Projections center on 2030, 2050, and 2080 under three scenarios: optimistic (SSP1 RCP 2.6), business-as-usual (SSP3 RCP 7.0), and pessimistic (SSP5 RCP 8.5). The 2080 milestone is built from the 2065–2095 window. Creative Commons; attribution required.
Federal government reportModel projection · scenario-dependentCounty / parcel
Mongird, Thurber, Vernon, Burleyson, Akdemir & Rice — Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (2025)IM3 Projected US Data Center Locations (v1.1)Model projections of new data center facilities across the contiguous US through 2035, produced with the CERF-Data Centers model by the IM3 project at PNNL, supported by the DOE Office of Science. These are modeled expectations, not announced projects — a distinction that matters, because a map of where a model puts facilities and a map of where developers have filed answer two different questions. CC BY 4.0.
Independent policy analysisCompiled from public filings and reportingCounty / parcel
Edward Kubiak — Compute Atlas (2026)An open, source-cited map of US data centersThe announced-reality layer: proposed, permitted, under-construction, and operational facilities with coordinates, each traced to public sources and human-reviewed before publication. Independently maintained rather than institutional, and it is a living record — figures move between refreshes, so anything drawn from it carries a retrieval date. Data CC BY 4.0.
Government agency memo or determinationCounty / parcel
North Carolina Department of Commerce (April 6, 2026)Memo to the Governor's Energy Policy Task ForceAbout 800 MW operational in North Carolina as of December 2025, with roughly 6,300 MW in the pipeline. Commerce issued 37 written data center tax-exemption determinations between 2015 and 2025; companies are not required to report actual investment or exemption value, and the list of 37 is not published. Commerce states openly that its MW figures come from Baxtel, a commercial tracker — a disclosure worth noticing, because it means the state is reading its own buildout off a private database.
Statute / session lawUtility territory
North Carolina Senate Bill 266 / Session Law 2025-78The Power Bill Reduction ActVetoed by Governor Stein on July 2, 2025; veto overridden July 29, 2025 (Senate 30-18, House 74-46). Eliminates from G.S. 62-110.9 the goal of reducing utility CO2 emissions 70% from 2005 levels by 2030 — the baseline year is not optional, because a percentage without a baseline is not a citable target. The 2050 carbon-neutrality requirement survives. Also broadens construction-work-in-progress recovery, so customers begin paying financing costs during construction rather than after it.
Last reviewed: August 2026We review this page quarterly. Statistics in this category change rapidly.Several threads in this section are actively moving — a North Carolina Utilities Commission decision is due in September 2026, and the water literature is publishing faster than it is being read. Sources still being confirmed against our research files are marked individually above.

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